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Resource Allocation for Secure Gaussian Parallel
Relay Channels with Finite-Length Coding
and Discrete Constellations
Linda Senigagliesi, Marco Baldi and Stefano Tomasin
Abstract—We investigate the transmission of a secret message
from Alice to Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve) and
many of decode-and-forward relay nodes. Each link comprises
a set of parallel channels, modeling for example an orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing transmission. We consider the
impact of discrete constellations and finite-length coding, defining
an achievable secrecy rate under a constraint on the equivocation
rate at Eve. Then we propose a power and channel allocation
algorithm that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate by resorting
to two coupled Gale-Shapley algorithms for stable matching
problem. We consider the scenarios of both full and partial
channel state information at Alice. In the latter case, we only
guarantee an outage secrecy rate, i.e., the rate of a message
that remains secret with a given probability. Numerical results
are provided for Rayleigh fading channels in terms of average
outage secrecy rate, showing that practical schemes achieve a
performance quite close to that of ideal ones.
Index Terms—Channel state information, decode-and-forward,
physical layer security, relay channel, resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adding secrecy features to the physical layer is an active
and promising research area [1], that complements traditional
computational security approaches. Indeed, a proper coding
scheme can prevent an eavesdropper Eve from getting infor-
mation on a message exchanged between the two legitimate
users Alice and Bob [2].
In this paper we expand the results of [3] on resource
allocation for confidential communications over the Gaussian
parallel relay channels, by including the more practical con-
straints of finite-length coding and discrete constellations. We
first derive the achievable secrecy rate of this scheme under the
assumption of full channel state information (CSI) by Alice
and the relay nodes. Then in order to consider the impact of
discrete constellations and finite-length coding we define an
achievable secrecy rate under a constraint on the equivocation
rate at Eve. Using an approximated formula of the achievable
secrecy rate we derive the optimal power allocation for point-
to-point confidential transmission. By exploiting the power and
rate adaptation algorithm for the parallel relay channels of [3],
we obtain a resource allocation algorithm coupling two Gale
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and Shapley algorithms to allocate resources over the parallel
relay channels. We also consider the partial CSI scenario, in
which Alice does not know the gains of her channels to Eve,
while their statistics are known. In this case we only guarantee
an outage secrecy rate, i.e., the rate of a message that remains
secret with a given probability. We show that the algorithm
derived for full CSI can be easily adapted to the partial CSI
scenario. Numerical results are provided, showing the merit of
the proposed solution.
A. Related Works
The physical layer security of messages transmitted over
parallel channels with the assistance of trusted relays has
already been addressed in the literature. Most works consider
that relays can either forward the message or generate a noise
signal to jam Eve. For links comprising a single channel,
early works have addressed the relay selection problem [4]–
[7], while various combinations of message forwarding and
jamming are considered in [8]–[10] with multiple antennas
nodes. In [11] multiple relays either jam or forward noise,
i.e., they transmit random codewords from a globally known
codebook, that hurts more Eve than Bob.
We focus on links comprising parallel channels. For this
scenario, in [12] rate-equivocation regions are derived by
considering one relay only and assuming full CSI. In [13]
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) is con-
sidered with a single relay, and Eve is equipped with multiple
antennas under partial CSI: subcarriers, powers and rates are
optimized to maximize the average secrecy outage capacity. In
[14] the downlink of a cellular system is considered - where
the multi-antenna base station performs both beamforming
and jamming against a single multi-antenna eavesdropper,
and an outage problem is formulated under partial CSI. The
scenario is extended in [15], where multiple relays operate in
decode and forward (DF) mode and still an outage approach
is considered. In [16] a single relay with parallel channels is
considered, which performs cooperative jamming against Eve,
under full CSI. When the single relay performs DF, resource
optimization has been considered in [17]. More comprehensive
results, considering also the direct transmission from Alice to
Bob are obtained in [18]. Resource allocation for transmission
over parallel channels assisted by DF relays without secrecy
features has also been widely studied. Bit loading [19] and
power and rate allocation [20] have been investigated, while
the availability of multiple relays transmitting on a single
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Fig. 1. Power flow of the relay parallel channels with N relays, r1, . . . rN . Mixers ⊗ and adders ⊎ represent element-wise multiplication and addition of
vectors, respectively.
sub-carrier is studied in [21], with efficient greedy algorithms
provided in [22]. The resource allocation for parallel channels
with secrecy outage constraint has been considered in [23] and
[24].
Recently, optimal resource allocation for security purposes
under different conditions has gained the attention of several
authors. In [25], an optimization framework is proposed for
two-hop communications that jointly optimizes source and
relay powers, and transmission time in each hop, with the
goal of maximizing the secrecy outage capacity in a massive
multiple input multiple output (MIMO) scenario. In [26],
optimal power allocation and pricing strategies are determined
using a Stackelberg game model in order to maximize the
players’ utilities, under both of perfect and imperfect CSI
assumptions and in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
An optimal power strategy to maximize the achievable secrecy
rates in wireless multi-hop DF relay networks with a power
constraint is studied in [27], under the assumption of global
CSI, and an iterative cooperative beamformer design is also
proposed. The work is extended in [28] to the case of full-
duplex relays, with cooperative beamforming to null out the
signal at multiple eavesdroppers. In [29] a heuristic resource
allocation iterative algorithm is presented, based on the prox-
imal theory that maximizes the secure capacity of device-
to-device communications in heterogeneous networks. Joint
source-relay power optimization in a dual-hop communication
using duality theory is performed in [30], with the aim of
maximizing the overall secrecy rate, under individual power
constraints and using an high SNR approximation. In [31],
a robust resource allocation framework is proposed in the
presence of an active eavesdropper, assuming that both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are full-duplex: the
receiver sends jamming signals against the eavesdroppers,
without the need for external helpers, and uncertain CSI
on the links between the eavesdropper and the legitimate
receivers is considered. Optimization algorithms for null space
beamforming with full CSI have been proposed in [32].
B. Contribution
With respect to the previously described state of the art,
the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
• No existing work considers the role of finite-length codes
and discrete constellations on the secrecy rate. Motivated
by this, we provide a formulation of the secrecy rate under
practical constraints and compare it with the achievable
rate in ideal conditions. We consider both perfect and
partial CSI under outage constraints.
• By proposing an approximated expression for the secrecy
rate under practical conditions we optimize the link-
level parallel channel power allocation generalizing the
solution of the ideal transmission scenario.
• Extending the approach in [3], we maximize the secrecy
rate by resorting to an iterative algorithm based on the
Gale and Shapley theory for the stable matching problem.
• Through numerical examples we show that it is possible
to achieve acceptable performance from the secrecy rate
standpoint even using short codes and constellations with
a small alphabet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
outlines the system model for secret message transmission over
parallel Gaussian relay channels. The achievable secrecy rates
under full CSI are computed in Section III, where we also
compute the outage secrecy rate. In Section IV an algorithm
for resource allocation of a secure point-to-point transmission
over parallel channels is obtained, which is used then in
Section V for the resource allocation in a relay network.
Numerical results of the proposed solution are presented in
Section VI, before some conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are written in bold letters.
We denote the base-2 and natural-basis logarithm by log and
ln, respectively. We indicate the positive part of a real quantity
3x as [x]
+
=max{x; 0}. E[X ] denotes the expectation of the
random variable X , P[·] is the probability operator, and T
denotes the matrix transpose operator. The entropy is denoted
as H(·), while the mutual information is denoted as I(·; ·).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication system to transmit a con-
fidential message M from Alice to Bob through N trusted
cooperating relays. Any link between a pair of devices is
constituted by a set of K parallel additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels. Eve is an eavesdropping device that
overhears communications originated from both Alice and the
relays. No direct link between Alice and Bob is available, and
all devices operate in half-duplex mode. Therefore the message
transmission comprises two phases:
1) Alice transmits to the relays, and
2) the relays transmit to Bob.
We also assume that in phase 2 at most one relay transmits
on channel k and that the two phases have the same duration.
Fig. 1 shows the power flow of the considered scenario. We
indicate with Pn,k the transmit power of Alice on channel k to
relay n in phase 1, while P¯n,k is the transmit power of relay
n on channel k in phase 2. The N×K matrix P (P¯ ) collects
all transmit powers, having Pn,k (P¯n,k) at entry n, k. In Fig.
1, P1K denotes the N -size column vector of transmit powers
for each relay, with 1K being the K-size column vector of all
ones. We consider power constraints for both Alice and the
relays, i.e.,
K∑
k=1
Pn,k ≤ Ptot,1, n = 1, . . . , N . (1a)
K∑
k=1
P¯n,k ≤ Ptot,2 , n = 1, . . . , N . (1b)
The power constraint per relay in phase (1) simplifies the
power allocation in this phase and still provides an upper
bound on the total transmit power from the source, that can
not exceed NPtot,1.
The link from Alice to relay n is represented by the K-
size column vector Hn = [Hn,1, . . . , Hn,K ]
T containing the
gains for each channel. The power of the data signal received
by relay n on channel k is therefore Hn,kPn,k. Similarly, the
vector H¯n denotes the power gains of the link between relay n
and Bob and H¯n,kP¯n,k is the power of the data signal received
by Bob from relay n on channel k. For links to Eve, G is the
vector of power gains of the signal coming from Alice, while
G¯n is the power gain vector of the signal coming from relay
n.
The noise is assumed to be independent identically dis-
tributed (iid), with zero mean and unitary (σ2n = 1 in Fig. 1)
variance for all channels. Therefore, the signal to noise ratio
(SNR) at relay n for a transmission from Alice on channel k
is Hn,kPn,k, and similarly for a transmission from relay n on
channel k the SNR at Bob in phase 2 is H¯n,kP¯n,k.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
We consider a per-channel encoding, i.e., Alice splits M
into K messages Mk, k = 1, . . . ,K , each of which is
separately encoded and transmitted on a channel. In [24] an in-
depth analysis of this coding strategy is provided, showing that
it performs similarly to the scheme with joint coding across
channels, while being simpler to design. Therefore, each relay
in general receives only a subset of the entire message bits.
In the second phase again each relay splits the received secret
bits into groups, which are separately encoded and transmitted
on a different channel, among those assigned to the relay.
In both phases, secrecy is achieved through classical wiretap
coding [1], based on adding random bits to the secret message
and encoding the resulting block with capacity achieving
codes. The weak secrecy rate of a point-to-point transmission
is the rate of a messageM that [1]: i) is correctly decoded by
Bob and ii) has a rate of mutual information with the signal
received by Eve Z that is vanishing for infinite codewords,
i.e.,
lim
l→∞
1
l
I(Z;M) = 0 , (2)
where l is the message length in bits. Due to the per-channel
encoding, the achievable weak secrecy rate is the sum of the
achievable secrecy rates on each used channel. Let Rn,k be
the secrecy rate on channel k, intended for relay n in phase 1,
and R¯n,k the secrecy rate on channel k transmitted by relay
n in phase 2. The achievable secrecy rate between Alice and
Bob is the minimum between the secrecy rates in both phases,
i.e.,
Rtot(P , P¯ ) =
1
2
N∑
n=1
min
{
K∑
k=1
Rn,k(Pn,k),
K∑
k=1
R¯n,k(Pn,k)
}
,
(3)
where the factor 1/2 is due to the two phases of the same
duration, and we have highlighted the dependence of the
achievable rates on the transmit powers.
Since we assume that Alice is transmitting to a single relay
per channel we also have
Rn∗,k(Pn∗,k) > 0→ Rn,k(Pn,k) = 0 , n 6= n∗ , (4)
and since we assume that at most one relay is transmitting in
any channel in phase 2 we also have
R¯n∗,k(P¯n∗,k) > 0→ R¯n,k(P¯n,k) = 0 , n 6= n∗ . (5)
In the following we derive the achievable secrecy rates,
when full CSI is available at Alice, taking into considera-
tion infinite and finite-length coding, continuous and discrete
modulation formats. Then with discuss the ǫ-outage achievable
secrecy rates when Alice has only a partial CSI, i.e., she knows
only the statistics of her channels to Eve.
A. Infinite-length coding with Gaussian Constellations
When infinite-length coding and Gaussian constellations are
used, perfect secrecy, i.e., no information leakage to Eve, can
be achieved [1]. In this case, the achievable secrecy rate can
be written as
Rn,k(Pn,k) = C(Pn,kHn,k)− C(Pn,kGn,k) , (6)
4where C(x) = log(1 + x). Similar expressions are obtained
for R¯n,k(P¯n,k) where Pn,k, Hn,k, and Gn,k are replaced by
P¯n,k, H¯n,k and G¯n,k, respectively.
B. Finite-length Coding with Gaussian Constellations
A first limitation to the achievable secrecy rates introduced
by practical systems is related to the use of codes working on
finite-length blocks of symbols. For simplicity and adherence
to practical systems, we consider deterministic coding, accord-
ing to which each l-bit block of data is univocally mapped
into a codeword Cn,k. This is opposed to either random or
coset coding, which are often invoked in the literature for this
kind of systems, but yield further issues (e.g., concerning the
generation of randomness). In our setting, weak secrecy cannot
be guaranteed and Eve can get some information on the secret
message1. Moreover, the decodability condition at Bob cannot
be guaranteed, and we will consider a non-zero codeword error
rate (CER) κ.
In order to measure the information leakage to Eve we
resort to the equivocation rate, i.e., Eve’s uncertainty about
the message after observing the transmitted codeword (through
her channel). For relay n transmitting on channel k and using
codewords of m symbols, the equivocation rate per symbol is
ρn,k(Pn,k, Rn,k(Pn,k)) =
1
2m
H(Mk|Zn,k) , (7)
ρ¯n,k(P¯n,k, R¯n,k(P¯n,k)) =
1
2m
H(Mk|Z¯n,k) , (8)
where the factor 2 comes from the fact that we have two phases
of the same duration. We have that
0 ≤ ρn,k(Pn,k, Rn,k(Pn,k)) ≤ Rn,k(Pn,k) , (9)
0 ≤ ρ¯n,k(P¯n,k, R¯n,k(P¯n,k)) ≤ R¯n,k(P¯n,k), (10)
where the upper bound is achieved with infinitely-long code-
words (m → ∞). We will consider that the transmission
system is secure if
ρn,k(Pn,k, Rn,k(Pn,k))
Rn,k(Pn,k)
≥ θ , ρ¯n,k(P¯n,k, R¯n,k(P¯n,k))
R¯n,k(P¯n,k)
≥ θ ,
(11)
where θ ∈ (0, 1] is a suitably defined parameter that limits
the gap with respect to weak secrecy conditions with infinite-
length coding. The achievable secrecy rates for finite-length
coding are therefore the maximum rates satisfying condition
(11), i.e.,
Rn,k(Pn,k) = max
r
r (12a)
s.t.
ρn,k(Pn,k, r)
r
≥ θ , (12b)
P[Mn 6= Mˆn] = κ . (12c)
A similar problem can be written for phase 2, for a given
allocated power P¯n,k, i.e.,
R¯n,k(P¯n,k) = max
r
r (13a)
1Indeed, the definition of weak secrecy (2) entails a limit to infinity of the
message length that can not be used in finite-codewords schemes.
s.t.
ρ¯n,k(P¯n,k, r)
r
≥ θ , (13b)
P[Mn 6= Mˆn] = κ . (13c)
In the following we focus on problem (12) as problem (13)
is analogous.
For the computation of the equivocation rate we resort
to a lower bound. By the definition of entropy and mutual
information, we have that Eve’s equivocation rate can be
rewritten as
ρn,k(Pn,k, Rn,k(Pn,k)) =
1
m
[H(Cn,k)− I(Cn,k;Zn,k)] ,
(14)
where Zn,k is the signal received by Eve in phase 1. By the
definition of spectral efficiency as upper bound to the mutual
information, we also have
I(Cn,k;Zn,k) < mC(Pn,kGn,k) . (15)
On the other hand, the entropy of Cn,k depends on the code
rate, which in turns determines the (non null) CER κ at
relay n, due to the use of finite-length coding. A Gaussian
approximation on the code rate as a function of the CER for
finite-length coding is provided by [33], that can be written as
H(Cn,k) ≃ m
[
C(Pn,kHn,k)− log e√
2m
Q−1(κ)
]+
, (16)
where [x]+ = x for x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, and Q(·) is
the complementary cumulative distribution function of the
standard Gaussian variable. Therefore, we have the following
approximation on Eve’s equivocation rate
ρn,k(Pn,k,Rn,k(Pn,k)) ≃ ξn, k(Pn,k) ,[
C(Hn,kPn,k)− log e√
2m
Q−1(κ)− C(Gn,kPn,k)
]+
.
(17)
By replacing ρn,k(Pn,k, Rn,k(Pn,k)) with its approximated
lower bound ξn,k(Pn,k) (and similarly for phase-2 equiv-
ocation rates) in problems (12) and (13), we obtain the
approximated achievable rates in the two phases; the solution
can be obtained by numerical methods.
We consider a fitting of Rn,k(Pn,k) solution of (12) by the
linear combination of logarithms of the powers, in order to
ease resource allocation, i.e.,
Rn,k(Pn,k) ≃ α1 + α2 log(1 + α3Hn,kPn,k)−
α4 log(1 + α5Hn,kPn,k)− [α6 log(1 + α7Gn,kPn,k)−
α8 log(1 + α9Gn,kPn,k)] .
(18)
Note that (18) directly models the achievable secrecy rate
rather the equivocation rate, and the parameters αi are chosen
at solution of problem (12). By this formulation the secrecy
rates with ideal conditions can be seen as a sub-case of (18)
with αi = 1 for i = 2, 3, 4, 5 and αi = 0 otherwise.
Fig. 2 shows Rn,k(Pn,k) as a function of Gn,kPn,k for
values of Hn,k/Gn,k between 2 dB and 20 dB with a step
of 1 dB, and results obtained by the fitting function (18) with
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Fig. 2. Rn,k(Pn,k) as a function of Gn,kPn,k for values of Hn,k/Gn,k
between 2 dB and 20 dB with a step of 1 dB, and results obtained with the
fitting function (18).
κ = 10−3 and m = 4, 096. We observe a good agreement of
the fitting function with Rn,k(Pn,k), especially at low rates,
and high values of Gn,kPn,k, with a slight overestimation
of the rate for intermediate values of Gn,kPn,k for high
Hn,k/Gn,k ratios.
C. Infinite-length Coding with Discrete Constellations
A second limitation of practical systems is the use of sub-
optimal constellations with discrete points taken from a finite
alphabet. In this case, perfect secrecy can still be achieved,
but we must consider the constellation-constrained spectral
efficiency Cˆ(·) instead of C(·), i.e., (6) becomes
Rn,k(Pn,k) = Cˆ(Pn,kHn,k)− Cˆ(Pn,kGn,k) . (19)
In order to obtain simple resource allocation algorithms
we consider the fitting of Cˆ(x) with a linear combination of
logarithmic functions, i.e.,
Cˆ(x) ≈ β1 + β2 log(1 + β3x)− β4 log(1 + β5x) . (20)
In addition, when the SNR x is larger than a prefixed threshold,
Cˆ(x) is clipped to the number of bits per symbol of the
discrete constellation in order to model the saturation of the
constellation-constrained spectral efficiency function.
Fig. 3 shows the approximation (20) of Cˆ(x) as a function
of the SNR for QPSK, 16-QAM and 64-QAM constellations,
and its comparison with the exact function. We observe a good
agreement between the approximated and the exact curves.
D. Finite-length Coding with Discrete Constellations
Let us consider the limitations introduced in Sections III-B
and III-C jointly, i.e., both finite-length coding and discrete
constellations, which describe a practical scenario. Also in this
case we resort to the equivocation rate for the definition of
the achievable secrecy rate (see problems (12) and (13)), by
replacing the spectral efficiency C(P ) with the constellation-
constrained spectral efficiency Cˆ(P ) in (17). On the other
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Fig. 3. The approximation (20) of Cˆ(x) as a function of the SNR (starred)
and comparison with the exact spectral efficiency (continuous) for some QAM
constellations.
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Fig. 4. Rn,k(Pn,k) as a function of Gn,kPn,k for values of Hn,k/Gn,k
between 2 dB and 20 dB with a step of 1 dB, and results obtained with the
fitting function (18), considering a 16-QAM constellation and m = 4, 096.
hand, since the approximation provided by [33] is valid for
any input distribution, (16) still holds true.
As already done in the previous section, we propose to fit
Rn,k(Pn,k) by the function (18). Fig. 4 shows Rn,k(Pn,k) for
values of Hn,k/Gn,k between 2 dB and 20 dB with a step of
1 dB, and results obtained by the fitting function (18) with
κ = 10−3, 16-QAM constellation and m = 4, 096.
E. ǫ-Outage Achievable Secrecy Rate
In many practical scenarios Alice and the relays have only
a partial CSI of their channels to Eve. This is mainly due to
the fact that Eve may not have an advantage in revealing its
channels, e.g., by transmitting, unless this could be useful to
increase the rate of other messages exchanged between her
and the legitimate nodes. Indeed, in the absence of full CSI
there is a non-zero probability (outage probability) that for
6any power allocation and choice of the secret message rate
Eve may get some information on M.
In particular, we focus on the secrecy outage probability in
each transmission phase and for each channel. Let πn,k and
π¯n,k be the secrecy outage probabilities on channel k with
respect to relay n in the first and the second phase, when
messages are transmitted at rates Rn,k(Pn,k) and R¯n,k(P¯n,k),
respectively. We consider as design criterion the limitation of
the secrecy outage probability on each channel, i.e.,
πn,k ≤ ǫ , π¯n,k ≤ ǫ , (21)
where ǫ is the target secrecy outage probability.
In the following we assume that the legitimate nodes know
the statistics of both Gn,k and G¯n,k, thus having a partial
CSI. If Rn,k(Pn,k) is the achievable secrecy rate for Alice-Eve
channel realization G∗n,k, then the secrecy outage probability
can be written as
πn,k = P[Gn,k > G
∗
n,k] . (22)
Similar expressions are obtained for the second phase. From
(21) we define Fǫ as the outage gain, i.e., the channel gain
for which
πn,k = P[Gn,k > Fǫ] = ǫ . (23)
Then the ǫ-outage achievable secrecy rate can be obtained from
the previous sections by considering Gn,k = G¯n,k = Fǫ.
IV. SINGLE LINK POWER OPTIMIZATION
We first consider the single-link power optimization, where
we allocate powers that maximize the secrecy sum rate be-
tween two nodes, using parallel channels. This problem must
be solved in both transmission phases and here we focus on the
first phase, i.e., the optimization of the communication from
Alice to a specific relay n, assuming that all power Ptot,1 can
be used on that link. In this situation we have Pn′,k = 0 for
n′ 6= n, n = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,K and we must solve
Rmax = max
{Pn,k}
K∑
k=1
Rn,k(Pn,k) , s.t. (1). (24)
The four cases of previous section are considered, i.e., a)
infinite-length coding with Gaussian constellations, b) finite-
length coding with Gaussian constellations, c) infinite-length
coding with discrete constellations, and d) finite-length coding
with discrete constellations. Moreover, we consider here the
case of ǫ-outage rates discussed in Section III-E, thus consid-
ering gain Fǫ for all channels to Eve.
A. Infinite-length Coding with Gaussian Constellations
For infinite-length coding with Gaussian constellations, the
optimization problem (24) has been solved in [34]. In particu-
lar, we immediately see that all channels for which Hn,k < Fǫ
must be switched off (Pn,k = 0) since they do not provide any
secrecy rate. Let the set of used channels be
F = {k : Hn,k > Fǫ} . (25)
Then we have
Pn,k = =
[
−Hn,k + Fǫ
2FǫHk
+
√
(Hn,k − Fǫ)2 + 4FHn,k(Hn,k − Fǫ)/λ)
2FǫHn,k
]+
,
(26)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier to be optimized in order
to satisfy the power constraint, which can be computed by a
dichotomic search.
B. Finite-length Coding with Gaussian Constellations
For finite-length coding with Gaussian constellations we
exploit the fitting (18) and the optimization problem (24)
becomes
Rmax = max
{Pn,k}
K∑
k=1
α1 + α2 log(1 + α3Hn,kPn,k)−
α4 log(1 + α5Hn,kPn,k)− α6 log(1 + α7FǫPn,k)+
α8 log(1 + α9FǫPn,k) ,
(27a)
subject to (1). (27b)
By applying the Lagrange multipliers method we obtain
α2α3Hn,k
1 + α3Hn,kPn,k
+
α4α5Hn,k
1 + α5Hn,kPn,k
+
+
α6α7Fǫ
1 + α7FǫPn,k
+
α8α9Fǫ
1 + α9FǫPn,k
− λ = 0 ,
(28)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier to be chosen in order to
satisfy the power constraint.
Hence by defining
An,k = λ ln(2)α3α5α7α9H
2
n,kF
2
ǫ , (29a)
Bn,k = α3α5α6α7α9H
2
n,kF
2
ǫ − α3α5α7α8α9H2n,kF 2ǫ −
α2α3α5α7α9H
2
n,kF
2
ǫ + α3α4α5α7α9H
2
n,kF
2
ǫ +
λ ln(2)α5α7α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ + λ ln(2)α3α7α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ +
λ ln(2)α3α5α9H
2
n,kFǫ + λ ln(2)α3α5α7H
2
n,kFǫ,
(29b)
Cn,k = λ ln(2)α3α5H
2
n,k − α2α3α5α9H2n,kFǫ+
λ ln(2)α7α9F
2
ǫ + λ ln(2)α5α7Hn,kFǫ−
α2α3α5α7H
2
n,kFǫ + α4α5α7α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ +
α3α4α5α9H
2
n,kFǫ + λ ln(2)α3α9Hn,kFǫ+
λ ln(2)α3α7Hn,kFǫ + α3α6α7α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ +
α3α5α6α7H
2
n,kFǫ − α5α7α8α9Hn,kF 2ǫ −
α3α7α8α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ − α3α5α8α9H2n,kFǫ+
λ ln(2)α5α9Hn,kFǫ − α2α3α7α9Hn,kF 2ǫ +
α3α4α5α7H
2
n,kFǫ + α5α6α7α9Hn,kF
2
ǫ ,
(29c)
7Dn,k = α4α5α7Hn,kFǫ − α2α3α9Hn,kFǫ−
α5α8α9Hn,kFǫ − α3α8α9Hn,kFǫ+
α5α6α7Hn,kFǫ − α2α3α7Hn,kFǫ+
α4α5α9Hn,kFǫ − α2α3α5H2n,k+
α3α6α7Hn,kFǫ + α6α7α9F
2
ǫ − α7α8α9F 2ǫ +
λ ln(2)α9Fǫ + λ ln(2)α7Fǫ + λ ln(2)α5Hn,k+
α3α4α5H
2
n,k + λ ln(2)α3Hn,k,
(29d)
En,k = λ ln(2)− α2α3Hn,k − α8α9Fǫ+
α6α7Fǫ + α4α5Hn,k
(29e)
the Lagrangian (28) becomes
An,kP
4
n,k +Bn,kP
3
n,k + Cn,kP
2
n,k
+Dn,kPn,k + En,k = 0 .
(30)
For all real positive roots of the polynomial, we compute (19)
and select the root yielding the highest secrecy rate. When no
real roots are found, it means that the secrecy rate is strictly
decreasing for Pn,k > 0, thus Pn,k = 0 and a null secrecy
rate is achieved.
Note that the algorithm must include a dichotomic search
over λ in order to satisfy the power constraints. Again, note
that the solution to problem (27) is a generalization of the
solution (26) for ideal transmission conditions.
C. Infinite-length Coding with Discrete Constellations
For infinite-length coding with discrete constellations, the
optimization problem (24) using the fitting (20) becomes
Rmax = max
{Pn,k}
K−1∑
k=0
{β1 + β2 log(1 + β3Hn,kPn,k)−
β4 log(1 + β5Hn,kPn,k)−
[β1 + β2 log(1 + β3FǫPn,k)
−β4 log(1 + β5FǫPn,k)]}+ ,
(31a)
subject to (1). (31b)
By comparing (27) with (31), we note that the two problems
are very similar, hence by applying also in this case the
Lagrange multiplier method we obtain again (30), with the
following coefficient values
α1 = 0, α2 = α6 = β2, α3 = α7 = β3,
α4 = α8 = β4, α5 = α9 = β5.
(32)
D. Finite-length coding with discrete constellation
For finite-length coding with discrete constellations, the
optimization problem (24) using the fitting (18) becomes (27)
and the Lagrange multiplier methods leads to (29).
V. MAXIMUM RATE POWER ALLOCATION
We now consider the power allocation problem at Alice and
Bob with the aim of maximizing the secrecy rate, i.e.,
Rmax = max
P ,P¯
Rtot(P , P¯ ) , (33a)
subject to power constraints (1), (33b)
A B
r2
r1
r3
r4
dI dII
∆
dE
Fig. 5. Node position diagram. A: Alice, B: Bob, rn: relay n.
and rate constraints (4) and (5). (33c)
As observed in [3], this is a mixed-integer programming
problem, and for its solution we resort to the iterative approach
of [3] based on the game-theoretic Gale and Shapley algorithm
for the stable matching problem [35]. Next we summarize the
algorithm, while referring the reader to [3] for its detailed
description.
The stable matching problem aims at matching dames to
cavaliers, without having a dame and a cavalier belonging
to two different couples both preferring to be matched. In
our scenario, dames and cavaliers are channels and relay,
respectively, and the preference of matching is the achievable
secrecy rate when using the channel for that relay. We have
actually two coupled stable matching problems for the two
phases. We use an iterative algorithm, where at each iteration
one step of the Gale and Shapley algorithm is performed for
both problems.
We start computing the overall rates obtained by assigning
all channels to each relay in phase 2 (finding the best power
allocation for both phases and the best channel assignment
in phase 1), and then we exclude the relay-channel couple
in phase 2 that provides the lowest rate. At the second
iteration we compute the overall rates obtained by assigning
all channels (except the couple excluded in the first iteration)
to each relay in phase 2 (again optimizing powers and phase-
1 channel allocation), before excluding another relay-channel
couple in phase 2 that provides the lowest rate. The process is
iterated excluding a couple at each iteration until for each
channel we have at most one associated relay in phase 2.
Within each iteration the channel allocation for phase 1 is
obtained again by the Gale and Shapley algorithm applied to
the matching of channels and relays in phase 1 (for a given
allocation in phase 2).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Scenario
Let us consider the scenario reported in Fig. 5, where the
relay nodes are positioned along a line that is orthogonal to
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Fig. 6. Average maximum secrecy rate as a function of dE with infinite-length
coding, both Gaussian and discrete (16-QAM) constellations and various
values of N .
the segment between Alice to Bob, intersecting it at a distance
dI and dII from Alice and Bob, respectively. Moreover, relays
are equispaced with a distance ∆ between any two adjacent
relays. We further assume that the eavesdropper is at least at
a distance dE from any transmitting node, i.e., it is outside of
the dashed circles surrounding Alice and the relays.
The K = 16 channels between any couple of nodes
are assumed independent Rayleigh fading. We also consider
Ptot,1 = Ptot,2 = 1. The average SNR at unitary distance
is of 0 dB, and the path loss coefficient is 3.5, thus the
average SNR at distance d is d−3.5. About the eavesdropper,
since it is assumed to be at a minimum distance dE from
any transmitting node, the outage gain is obtained from (23)
and from the Rayleigh fading assumption P[Gn,k ≤ Fǫ] =
exp[−Fǫ/(d−3.5E )], therefore
Fǫ = −d−3.5E ln ǫ . (34)
For finite-length coding we assume a CER at Bob κ = 10−3
and m = 128 and 4, 096.
B. Impact of Eve’s distance
We first consider a scenario in which each relay has the
same distance from Alice and Bob, i.e., dI = dII = 0.8, the
separation between relays is ∆ = 0.05, the number of relays
is N = 2, 4 or 8.
Figs. 6-9 show the average maximum outage secrecy rate
E[Rmax], averaged over channel realizations, as a function of
dE, for a target secrecy outage probability ǫ = 10
−4, and
comparing different coding and constellations settings. In par-
ticular, Fig. 6 reports results for a transmission using infinite-
length coding and both Gaussian and discrete constellations,
Fig. 7 shows results for finite-length coding and both Gaussian
and discrete constellations. In both cases we note that, as
expected, Gaussian signaling outperforms discrete modulation
(16-QAM) in terms of secrecy rate, regardless of the use of
infinite- or finite-length codes. Moreover, by increasing the
number of relays, the average maximum outage secrecy rate
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Fig. 7. Average maximum outage secrecy rate as a function of dE with
finite-length coding (m = 4, 096), both Gaussian and discrete (16-QAM)
constellations and various values of N .
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Fig. 8. Average maximum outage secrecy rate as a function of dE with
Gaussian constellation, both infinite- and finite-length (m = 128 and m =
4, 096) coding and various values of N .
increases, as a diversity gain is available on the links among
legitimate nodes. Moreover, as dE → ∞ we note that the
rate curves flattens in correspondence of the unsecure rate of
the relay parallel channels, as in this case security conditions
are always met and the performance is limited only by the
legitimate channel conditions.
C. Impact of Codeword Length
In Figs. 8 and 9 the impact of finite-length coding for both
Gaussian and discrete constellations is investigated. Note that
the performance of codes with long codewords (m = 4, 096) is
comparable to that of infinite-length coding. Considering a 16-
QAM, differences between infinite-length coding and 4,096-
length coding are negligible as the average maximum outage
secrecy rates coincide for all numbers of relay nodes. In Fig.
9 we note that short codes (m = 128) instead visibly degrade
the average maximum secrecy rate.
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Fig. 9. Average maximum outage secrecy rate as a function of dE with 16-
QAM, both infinite and finite-length coding (m = 128) and various values
of N .
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Fig. 10. Average maximum outage secrecy rate as a function of dI/dII ,
various values of ∆, and finite-length coding (m = 4, 096) with discrete
(16-QAM) constellations, for dE = 10, ǫ = 10
−4 and N = 4 relays.
D. Impact of Relative Node Distances
We then study the impact of the relative distances among
legitimate nodes. In particular, we fix the Alice-Bob distance
to dI + dII = 2, and we let the ratio between the two
distances dI/dII and the distance among the relays vary, i.e.,
∆ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.5}, for dE = 10, ǫ = 10−4 and N = 4
relays.
Fig. 10 shows the average maximum outage secrecy rate as
a function of dI/dII, and finite-length coding (m = 4, 096)
with Gaussian constellations. We observe that for decreasing
values of ∆ the curves tend asymptotically to a maximum
average secrecy rate of 2 b/s/Hz. On the other hand, as dI/dII
tends to infinity, the average maximum outage secrecy rate
tends to zero, as the Alice-relay links will provide vanishing
data rates. When the distance ∆ tends to zero all the relay
nodes are squeezed in the same point between Alice and Bob,
which represents the optimal relaying configuration.
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Fig. 11. Average maximum outage secrecy rate as a function of dE , with
infinite-length coding (m = 4, 096) and Gaussian constellations, obtained
using: GS power allocation, water-filling and uniform power allocation.
E. Comparison With Other Solutions
Figs. 11 and 12 provide a comparison between our re-
source allocation (denoted as Gale-Shapley, or GS) strategy
and two suboptimal solutions, respectively uniform power
allocation over the K channels and water-filling allocation.
Various scenarios are considered, i.e. infinite-length codes
with Gaussian signaling and finite-length coding with discrete
constellations. We also consider that each relay has the same
distance from Alice and Bob, i.e., dI = dII = 0.8, the
separation between relays is ∆ = 0.05, the number of relays is
N = 2, 4 or 8. Water-filling provides the best possible power
allocation in Eve’s absence, since it assigns more power to
the channels presenting better gains. However, this solution
is not convenient from a security standpoint, since channels
that are good for the legitimate receiver could also be good
for the attacker, thus degrading the secrecy performance. As
predictable, uniform allocation leads to the worst average
secrecy rate for all the considered cases.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have derived the secrecy rate of the
Gaussian relay parallel channel under finite-length coding and
discrete constellation constraints, defined as the maximum rate
for which a minimum equivocation rate is achieved at Eve.
Moreover, we have applied a coupled version of the Gale and
Shapley algorithm to allocate power within each channel in
order to maximize the secrecy rate. Numerical results show the
effectiveness of the resource allocation approach we consider,
and show that moderate sizes of both the constellation alphabet
and the codewords are sufficient to achieve close-to-optimal
secrecy rates for typical wireless transmission scenarios.
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